Oversight of ONS

The governance of ONS is essentially defined by:

• the legislation which establishes the Board of the UK Statistics Authority, and its two executive roles of National Statistician and the Director General of Regulation, with the Board responsible for promoting and safeguarding the production and publication of official statistics, including accuracy, relevance and impartiality; and
• the rules governing the management of, and responsibilities of, Permanent Secretaries.

The link between the two arises because the National Statistician has traditionally also been the Permanent Secretary head of the ONS.

The Cabinet Office then plays two roles: as the Department holding the responsibility for the ONS as a “non-Ministerial Department”; and because the Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office is, in practice, the line manager of the ONS Permanent Secretary (who is a Crown appointment, notwithstanding his or her executive role on the UKSA Board).

These complexities were born of a commendable interest on the part of the then Government to re-affirm, and strengthen, the independence of official statistics, by introducing the relevant legislation (the Statistics and Registration Services Act 2007). The legislation is about the entire system of official statistics, not simply ONS.

Since the legislation came into effect, there have been 4 Chairs of the Board, and 5 National Statisticians, all operating within the same system of governance. In respect of the performance of ONS, this system ultimately relies on:

• accurate information being provided to the Board, including appropriate metrics;
• the Board’s approval of the Internal Audit programme, and scrutiny of its outputs;
• the Board’s scrutiny of the Regulator’s work in respect of ONS outputs;
• rigorous assessment by the Board, particularly of performance and risk;
• clear Board feedback to the National Statistician; and
• Board input to the Cabinet Office’s line management of the National Statistician.

The Cabinet Office and HM Treasury may arrange their own scrutiny of elements of ONS work, always respecting ONS’ operational independence.

Of course, all systems of governance ultimately turn on the efficacy with which each person, and body, plays their part. And sifting sometimes conflicting evidence is hard. Given the issues I have recorded above, I am not surprised that various concerns were both felt, and expressed, by the Board. With hindsight, stronger intervention earlier might have resulted in the welcome change of direction now evident at ONS.